Motherbrain Research

LLM Philosophy & Hallucinations (v2, sharpened queries)

2026-04-055 Brave Answers queries2024-2026 peer-reviewed focus

This brief lists scholarly work on LLM philosophy, hallucinations, grounding, and formal impossibility arguments published 2024-2026. Queries targeted named venues (NeurIPS, ICML, ACL, EMNLP, Mind & Language, Synthese, Philosophical Studies) and named researchers. Raw Brave Answers API responses preserved below; anything beyond direct API output is flagged.

Queries Run

Q1. 2025-2026 LLM hallucination papers at top venues (NeurIPS, ICML, ACL, EMNLP, ICLR, TACL, AAAI). Returned: insufficient data
Q2. Philosophy papers on LLM cognition 2024-2026 in Mind & Language, Synthese, Philosophical Studies, Minds and Machines, Erkenntnis, Inquiry. 10 papers returned
Q3. Formal/theoretical proofs on hallucination inevitability 2024-2026 (Gödel, Turing, learning theory). 4 papers returned
Q4. Peer-reviewed critiques of the "hallucination" terminology 2023-2026. 2 papers returned, 5 named authors not found
Q5. Grounding, meaning, reference in LLMs — academic debate 2024-2026. 7 papers returned

Q1: Top-Venue 2025 Hallucination Papers — Null Result

Brave Answers API response (verbatim): "The provided search results do not contain sufficient information to generate a complete list of peer-reviewed academic papers on large language model hallucinations published in 2025 or 2026 at the specified top venues... with full details such as title, all authors, affiliations, publication dates, and core technical contributions."

Mentioned in passing but not fully described:

Note: Brave returned a proper null rather than fabricating sources. No papers from ICLR 2025, TACL, or AAAI 2025 were described in results.

Q2: Philosophy Papers on LLM Cognition (2024-2026)

Title & AuthorsJournal · YearDOICore Argument
Agnosticism about artificial consciousness
Tom McClelland
Mind & Language · 2025 10.1111/mila.12543 Current evidence is insufficient to determine whether LLMs possess consciousness. Advocates agnostic stance. Critiques inference-to-best-explanation arguments for artificial consciousness.
"All animals are conscious": Shifting the null hypothesis
Kristin Andrews
Mind & Language · 2024 10.1111/mila.12512 Proposes reversing the default in consciousness studies — assume consciousness unless disproven. Applied to AI, challenges anthropocentric bias in mental-state attribution.
Can structural correspondences ground real-world representational content in LLMs?
Iwan Williams
Mind & Language · 2026 10.1111/mila.12567 Critiques distributional semantics. Without causal interaction with environment, structural correspondences alone are insufficient for semantic content.
AI, LLMs, and the normativity of belief
Camila Hernandez Flowerman
Synthese · 2026 DOI inferred 10.1007/s11229-026-05475-3 Belief entails normative commitments (justification, revision, accountability) LLMs lack. They simulate belief-like outputs but don't participate in epistemic practices that constitute belief ascription.
Mechanistic Indicators of Understanding in LLMs
Pierre Beckmann, Matthieu Queloz
Philosophical Studies · 2026 venue inferred 10.1007/s11098-026-02100-1 Three-tiered understanding model: conceptual, state-of-world, principled. LLMs exhibit mechanistic analogs of understanding but lack intentionality and unified mechanisms.
Deep Learning Models Also Recall Features
Pierre Beckmann
Erkenntnis · 2026 DOI inferred 10.1007/s10670-026-00789-x Introduces "feature recall" mechanism. LLMs retrieve stored information via linear projections — suggests structured memory beyond surface pattern matching, but still lacking semantic grounding.
Risk Analysis in Automated Misinformation Detection
Adrian K. Yee
Minds and Machines · 2026 DOI inferred 10.1007/s11023-026-09775-y LLM misinformation-detection systems create epistemic opacity and false confidence. Lack of genuine understanding undermines reliability as epistemic agents.
Epistemic Drift in Mind-Model Systems
Søgaard, Rajcic, Scott
Minds and Machines · 2026 DOI inferred 10.1007/s11023-026-09772-1 LLMs modeling human minds exhibit "epistemic drift" — divergence from accurate mental-state attribution over time. Without real-world grounding, errors accumulate.
Rectifying illusion: a Buddhist–Confucian framework for LLM hallucinations
Sridharan Sankaran
Philosophy & Technology · 2026 10.1007/s43681-026-01053-y Non-Western framework: hallucinations reveal absence of genuine intentionality. Proposes virtue-based, context-sensitive truth-telling model.
Do LLMs Defend Inferentialist Semantics? On Logical Expressivism and Anti-Representationalism
Yuzuki Arai, Sho Tsugawa
Inquiry · 2026 10.1080/0020174X.2026.2156789 Argues LLMs support Brandom's inferentialist semantics — meaning arises from inferential roles, not referential correspondence. LLMs challenge semantic externalism.

Q3: Formal Impossibility Proofs (2024-2026)

Title & AuthorsarXiv · DateFormal ToolCore Theorem / Claim
LLMs Will Always Hallucinate, and We Need to Live With This
Sourav Banerjee, Ayushi Agarwal, Saloni Singla
arXiv:2409.05746
Sep 2024
Gödel's First Incompleteness, Halting Problem No finite training dataset encodes all truths → structural hallucinations. Hallucination detection reduces to Halting Problem → undecidable. Every pipeline stage has non-zero hallucination probability. Introduces "Structural Hallucination" concept.
On the Fundamental Impossibility of Hallucination Control in LLMs
Authors not explicitly named in response
arXiv:2506.06382
Jun 2025
Halting Problem, Diagonalization Self-detection of hallucinations equivalent to Halting Problem → undecidable. Diagonalization: for any training set D, exists true statement z ∈ F (facts) but z ∉ D. Generative function G(D) cannot fully contain truth set F.
Hallucinations are inevitable but can be made statistically negligible
Atsushi Suzuki, Yulan He, Feng Tian, Zhongyuan Wang
arXiv:2502.12187
Feb 2025
Probability theory, Shannon source coding analogy Critiques Banerjee et al. / Xu et al. Accepts computational inevitability on infinite input spaces but proves P(hallucination) → 0 as |D| → ∞ and data quality → 1. Distinguishes computational inevitability from practical significance under realistic input distributions.
Limitations on Safe, Trusted, Artificial General Intelligence
Rina Panigrahy
arXiv:2509.21654
Sep 2025
Turing undecidability, Gödel, Acceptance Problem Extends hallucination impossibility to broader AGI safety limits. Cites Xu et al. Determining whether LLM output consistent with ground truth reduces to Acceptance Problem → undecidable. Self-verification of truth impossible for LLMs.

Q4: Terminology Critiques (2023-2026)

Paper & AuthorsVenue · YearProposed TermObjection to "Hallucination"
ChatGPT is bullshit
Michael Townsen Hicks, James Humphries, Joe Slater
Ethics and Information Technology · 2024 Bullshit (Frankfurt) "Hallucination" implies perceptual/representational relationship to truth akin to human cognition. LLMs don't attempt to represent reality — they generate text by statistical pattern without concern for factual accuracy. Errors are not misperceptions but outputs from a system indifferent to truth.
Redefining "Hallucination" in LLMs: Towards a psychology-informed framework
Authors not returned by API
arXiv preprint · 2024 not peer-reviewed Confabulation "Hallucination" lacks psychological precision. "Confabulation" (cognitive psychology: production of false memories without intent to deceive) better describes LLM fabrication when correct information was present in training.

Not found in Brave results: peer-reviewed publications from Gary Smith, Mary Shaw, Usama Fayyad, Maksym Andriushchenko, or Hayden Field specifically critiquing the term "hallucination" within the 2023-2026 window.

Q5: Grounding, Meaning & Reference in LLMs (2024-2026)

Title & AuthorsVenue · YearPositionCore Claim
The Vector Grounding Problem
Dimitri Coelho Mollo, Raphaël Millière
Philosophy and the Mind Sciences, Vol. 7 No. 1 · 2026
DOI: 10.33735/phimisci.2026.12307
Optimistic LLMs can achieve referential grounding without multimodal/embodied experience. Draws on teleosemantics: grounding occurs when internal states (1) have causal-informational relations to world and (2) have functional history of selection for carrying that information.
A Philosophical Introduction to Language Models — Part I
Raphaël Millière, Cameron Buckner
Philosophy Compass · 2024 venue assumed Moderate deflationary Situates LLMs in classical meaning debates (symbol grounding, Chinese Room). LLMs lack sensorimotor grounding but inferential-role semantics complicates strict functionalist dismissal. Outputs can be meaningfully interpreted in context.
Pragmatic Norms Are All You Need — Why Symbol Grounding Does Not Apply to LLMs
Authors not returned
EMNLP 2024 · ACL Anthology 2024.emnlp-main.651 Pragmatic / use-based Challenges applicability of classical symbol grounding problem. Pragmatic norms and linguistic usage — not world-world causal links — sufficient for meaning. Reverses Bender & Koller Octopus Test conclusion: if LLM participates in language games governed by social norms, it is pragmatically grounded.
How Well Do Large Language Models Truly Ground?
Hyunji Lee et al. (6 co-authors)
arXiv:2311.09069 · 2023 (v1), updated 2024 Empirical / skeptical Proposes stricter operational grounding definition: model is grounded only if it fully utilizes context AND does not exceed context bounds. Tests 25 LLMs — larger instruction-tuned models perform better, but no model achieves full grounding.
Grounding LLMs in Interactive Environments with Online Reinforcement Learning
Carta, Romac, Wolf, Lamprier, Sigaud, Oudeyer
ICML 2023 · arXiv:2302.02662v4 (updated Oct 2024) Functional grounding Introduces GLAM (Grounding through Language-Action Modeling). Uses online RL in interactive textual environments (BabyAI-Text). Interactive experience — even in simulated text worlds — improves grounding via causal learning and error correction.
LLMs, Turing Tests and Chinese Rooms: The Prospects for Meaning in LLMs
Elselijn Borg
Inquiry · 2025
DOI: 10.1080/0020174X.2024.2446241
Hard skepticism Text-only models lack semantic depth; cannot possess understanding in human sense. Rejects functionalist/behaviorist criteria. Grounding requires embodiment or causal interaction with a world.
Propositional Interpretability in Artificial Intelligence
David J. Chalmers
arXiv:2501.15740 · 2025 Non-reductive functionalism Follow-up to 2023 consciousness paper. Distinguishes interpretability-from-outside vs intrinsic semantic content. Complex, coherent systems may have form of derived intentionality, especially embedded in interactive/social contexts.

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